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CaseNo.20070068-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
RORY DEMBERT, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendant appeals from a conviction for aggravated assault, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (West 2004). This Court 
has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West Supp. 2008). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES1 
1. Did the trial court properly deem Defendant's untimely motion to 
suppress his statements to police as waived under rule 12, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure? 
Standard of Review. A trial court's decision to treat an untimely motion to 
suppress evidence as waived, or to grant relief from such waiver, is reviewed for 
an abuse of discretion. See State v. Belgard, 830 P.2d 264,265-66 (Utah 1992). 
1
 Because the State believes Defendant's second issue is most logically 
addressed first, the State has reversed the issues in its brief. 
2. Was Defendant's trial counsel constitutionally ineffective for failing to 
timely file the motion to suppress his statements to police? 
Standard of Review. "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for 
the first time on appeal presents a question of law/' reviewed for correctness. 
State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, \ 6,89 P.3d 162, 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
U.S. Const, amend. V; U.S. Const, amend. VI; Utah R. Crim. P, 12 (relevant 
text reproduced in the Addendum). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Charges and Bindover. On July 18, 2006, Defendant was charged by 
information with the aggravated assault of Angelo Pollock, a second degree 
felony. R. 1-3. After holding a preliminary hearing, a magistrate bound 
Defendant over to stand trial. R. 31-32. 
Motion to Suppress Defendant's Statement to Police. On the morning of 
trial, Defendant filed a motion to suppress his statement to police. R. 100-01; R. 
170: 7. In support of the motion, counsel for Defendant, Lisa Remal, relied on a 
transcript of the police interview that she had "made for [her] own help/7 R. 170: 
7. She provided the court and the prosecutor with a copy of it, but did not 
introduce it into evidence. R. 170: 7-8. Nor did she introduce the police 
department's audio/video recording of the interrogation. See R 170. 
2 
I Inferring to her transcript, Ms- Remal ar r 
Smith secured Defendant's Miranda waiver, Defendant 'unequivocally ii t v oked his 
u ngn r :£\ccr Portel. R. 170: 7 *" ~* claimed that after reading the 
, - .-„\ riKu loiui cu^ut Defendnnt vhefher he " ;[t '] 
u ^ i ic bc ...w .;i response, U d d i ^ -4-"™^ 
rather than the we J - uta .. ~^ 
uh/" which, she argued, meant "no, I don't wan 1 
The prosecutor objected to the motion lo ^ ^ r r e s s , 3^cv;r * -* - * 
\iv,,.-1 leiy ana u LUS waived under the Utah Rules ot C. _d Procedure. R. 17 0: 
III, I le iJicn 1; riefly respon..-..u ^ the merits by offering the court a copy of 
D(-!.-'n<iir.»'c ^
 >;:il.^ —- _ t.;.iDeensecurt,4 L-V • •.•[ F ir?0i 
10. WhenMs.Rem.il mi uncivil tin H IVfiTidn i lui 1 <IIH,UI|^  mi nkixJ lui- n^ltl in 
remain silent, the prosecutor complained that l* IMHn't 
accurate [Ms. Remal's] transcript is. R. 170:^. ^ " a s s u i ^rel^v -1 ^ 
but ..
 sued that Defendant "ma[de] some ambiguous noises, .ili-huh, J I 
i
 r< . . oric/s question as to whether he wished to answer 
c"_* niestion - 'n1 nstjI Ji I n I l i q u i d to the prosecutor's 
waiver argument or otherwise offer .i ii.\ r«iust« jnslifying relief It" 1 lie Idle tiling. 
See R. 170:10-13. 
3 
After a brief recess, the trial court denied the motion "on the basis of the 
timeliness issue." R. 170: 13-14. The court explained that under rule 12, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, motions to suppress must "be brought no later than 
five days prior to trial, or they're deemed waived." R. 170:14. The court then 
commented, "for edification of the Counsel," that "if [it] were to address the 
merits," it "would rule that the motion ought to be denied" because Lieutenant 
Smith's subsequent discussion with Defendant "was in effort to clarify 
[Defendant's] rights under the Miranda warning." R. 170:14. 
Conviction and Appeal. Defendant was thereafter tried and convicted by a 
jury as charged; he was sentenced to a prison term of one-to-fifteen years. R. 82-
83,114-15,143,147-48,170-71. Defendant timely appealed. R. 157-58. Because 
the full audio/video recording of Defendant's interrogation at the police station 
was not introduced into evidence below, the parties filed with the Court a 
Stipulation of facts "as they relate to Defendant's claim that his attorney at trial 
provided ineffective assistance of counsel." Stipulation, filed November 12,2008. 
4 
' STATEMENT O F F A PTS2 
In ti LV w e, w *^ of July 16,2006, Angel-»« !i| I u. k and his friend Tony were 
han^ii \b v • . . tc K. v.a Home, a homeless shelter on Rio Grande Street in Salt 
LakeCitv * i • mtei iniuiugiu, i uiiiAk bought a small piece 
of cocaine and billowed it. i< I P 1V19-4^ !•» " i >' I >^jtedsome 
cocaine, so he gave Pollock money to buy more1 lu* > "ri" ' I'l i. 11'"11 
.1 v i i lock left the park looking for another cocaine source, Defc± uacu i s i < * \ \• ,ri v 11 s«i; > 
. ._igiiigoui .ii die area, began following Pollock and "harassing" h ^ , ^ cocaine. 
' '"* "It I- 2 I .". "v 4i', 45-4^. r OIIOLK told Defendant, whom., he did not know, that 
he did not li AW JII ," 1\ l"1"1 / I ,
 t\\f l> /" tiiei J u i ti«i ig a dealer, i\ il lock bought a 
" twenty" piece of cocaine and ref n m« -1 h « t* *l '( •
 lk. .<„.*.., .w, .,» Hi iat 
down on a bench, bit off a piece of the cocaine for hi m ^  • i * . • •« t!-. 
mend Tony, ^ 170: 21,24,39-41,49-50. 
Aggravated Assault 
Defen .aiamg |rou«.K.kj ror some cocaine/' R 170 ~2, 
24,45-46,50-51. A=>uv * - ,: i • K: . . -picas, , „. 1-22,24, 
45, 50-51. ~ " _>ck left the bench, knelt on the -ro 
tried to open a bottle of wine Tony had given him. R. 170:20-2^ \ "* - v> ~'• -~ " 
2
 Consistent with an appellate court's review of the record on appeal, the 
State recites "the record facts in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict;" State 
v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337,339 (Utah 1 997) 
5 
he did so, Pollock saw Defendant with a large knife raised over his head, poised 
to attack him. R. 170:26,52,55. Pollock dropped everything, including the small 
knife, stood up, raised both hands in self-defense, and yelled, "What's going on?" 
R. 170:26-27,46-47,53,110. Defendant lunged at Pollock and stabbed him in the 
stomach. R. 170: 27-28,53. Pollock fell to the ground and then tried to fend off 
Defendant's further attacks, but to no avail. R. 170: 28. As Pollock, lay on the 
ground, Defendant repeatedly stabbed Pollock—again in the stomach, in the 
shoulder, and in the buttocks. R. 170:27-28,53-54. Pollock yelled, "I'm done." R. 
170:28,53. Defendant responded, "I know you are," and walked away. R. 170: 
28-29,53. 
When the assault occurred, Gail Cameron was working the front desk 
inside the Road Home. R. 170:61-62. She could view activity outside the shelter 
on a monitor connected to an outside camera. R. 170:62-63,71. When Defendant 
first assaulted Pollock, she was turned away from the monitor. See R. 170: 63. 
However, she looked back in time to see Pollock "fall to the ground." R. 170: 63, 
71-72. She then saw Pollock lying on his back, "with his hands and liis feet in the 
air, as though he were trying to defend himself."See R. 170: 63-64, 71-72. Ms. 
Cameron saw Defendant standing over Pollock. R. 170: 65-67. He appeared 
angry and was postured to hit Pollock. R. 170:65-67. She then saw him "lean[ ] 
over" and appear to slug Pollock two to three times, while Pollock "tr[ied] to 
6 
ward off the attack/' R. 170:66,75. "When Defendant stood up and stepped back, 
Ms. Cameron saw that Defendant was holding a large knife. R. 170:66-67. "[I'Jor 
iet second, [Defendant] just stood there with the knife in his hand/' R. 170: 
, ^ una v\ aiKed east across the street," r^ippearing into a 
Two women helped Pollorl* nil id i I he sheltei 1- 111 1,,li nn % ufi u{i On < 
inside, Pollock began losing consciousness and the two women helpeu i imi. 
floor. ~ "~~ 69-70. Meanwhile, Ms. Cameron telephoned 9-1-1. R. 170: 67-68. 
er An j, •i-~1 who wa s just around the v. orne r, arrived short] y aftei ~\ 
t i n * * . <. • i * . i -Itxf^iK i j • <. " 
03. Emereen' ;cuical persorr > s * -s 
Defendant to 'the hospital, where he underwent emergency surgery. See R. 170: 
30,70,103. 
Defe •  |;" i I i .• it's Arrest 
Officers Mike Blarkbin n JIHI! Kevin l;ord rei- ponded to the scene in search 
of the suspect, described as ,i ''inale BLirff ,nli«lt \v<\inn£ n hlnrk shirt .iiini 1 \ liiiiil 
pants." R. 170: 77-78, 90-91, 97-98. They spotted Defendai it, w ho matched 
suspect's description, across the street from the shelter, crouched down on a 
sidewalk with a dark green duffle bag in. front of him. R. 170:78-80,83,85,91-93. 
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When they approached Defendant, he was fidgeting with the duffle bag and "was 
really nervous, real apprehensive to make eye contact." R. 170: 79-80, 91-92. 
With the aid of a flashlight, Officer Ford peered inside Defendant's open duffle 
bag and saw two knives; the blade of one was "poking up with blood running 
down it." R. 170: 94-96,98,100,118-19,127; SE10. 
At a showup in front of the shelter, Ms. Cameron identified Defendant as 
the assailant and said "she was 100 percent sure." R. 170:105. Another woman 
also identified Defendant as the assailant, but said she was "about 80 percent 
sure." R. 170:105. Defendant was arrested and transported to the police station. 
R. 170: 81-83,94,105-07. 
Defendant's Interview with Police 
In an interview room at the police station, Officer Portel placed a Miranda 
waiver form on the table in front of Defendant and advised him of his Miranda 
rights. Stip. %% 1-2. The following exchange then took place: 
Officer Portel: Do you understand these rights? 
Defendant: Yes. I'm being charged? 
Officer Portel: Urn, yes, you are under arrest. 
Defendant: For what? 
Officer Portel: For aggravated assault. 
Officer Portel: Now, if you would like to tell me your side of the story, 
because, like I said, I'm kind of missing some of the 
information I think, uh, I need you to sign this form 
saying that you, you do want to talk to me, you, you do 
8 
W a n t t o hf ; W :! c i «i u n - < in ; , 11 i n n n j *h f ninnni i 
"Vfend*.v ;: I! 
' -"i-rer Portel: No,youd<Mi i IMV ' 
a lendant: I won't (shaking hc> • 
>jiiiccT Portel: You're not goin^ ? — • •. 
Defend; *: ] ishaking heac .. 
Officer Portel: So, you don't want to answer any questions right now? 
Defendant: Huh-uh (shaking head). 
Officer Portel: Okay. 
Stip.fZ ^ncerPortelthenfoldpit1 r . r 
her notebook. While putting her pen back 
^ H Defendant that she needed to verify his name and . . . 
ideiitificatioii. Stip. f 3. As she did so,. Lieutenant C.T. Smith "opened the door 
.in.I .isked to speak willt limi Hhcer Portel exited Jeaving Defendant alone in the 
room/' ^ HT 
About a minute later, "I A. Smith mi] * Hlimr IWU'I re-enKied ihtji i M IJJI I f, 
Smith explained to Defendant that he was 'possibly respon-lHi 
sent a man to the hospital, but that they 'don't 1 the \\ hoL „ .3. -v r 
( , -_. ^'.unMung mat LAiendant had been read his Miranda rights and that! 
unders" ^ J *; **. /.< . .;-. , ataith\ he was under 
arrest and not ^rc f . up. \^ i ne 
told. Defendant that police had 'an indication' 1 Vl'rmlrinl "rrnijil h • -, <' 
for the crime, but that they 'don't know the other side of the stor fold 
9 
Defendant that this was his opportunity to tell police his side of the story and 'get 
it out there on public record/ if he wished to do so." Stip. % 8. Lt. Smith told 
Defendant, however, that "he was not required to speak with police." Stip. % 8. 
Lt. Smith then requested the Miranda waiver form from Officer Porte I and re-read 
Defendant his rights. See Stip. J 9; see SE19 (00:00-00:32). 
After Defendant confirmed that he understood his rights, Lt. Smith asked 
him if he "want[ed] to tell [his] side of the story." SE19 (00:33-00:50). In response, 
Defendant said that it was "basically... just a misunderstanding." SE19 (00:51-
00:56). Referring to the written waiver form, Defendant again asked whether he 
had to sign it; Lt. Smith responded that he did not and that it was up to him. 
SE19 (01:05-1:18). Defendant signed the waiver, as did Lt. Smith. SE19 (01:18-
02:19); Stip. <[9. 
Defendant told the officers that "it was a fight." SE19 (02:41-02:45). When 
Lt. Smith asked if he remembered what the fight started over, Defendant said, 
"something stupid." SE19 (03:03-03:15). Officer Portel asked Defendant to 
identify "what the stupid thing" was, because they "might not think it's so 
stupid" if he told them. SE19 (03:17-03:31). Defendant responded that it was 
about "being real stupid,.. . being in the wrong place at the wrong time and just 
not . . . paying attention to . . . what's going around." SE19 (03:45-04:02),, 
Continuing, Defendant said, "you never know the situation. [Now] I have 
10 
problems." SE19 (04:08-04:17), Officer Portel told Defendant that he "must have 
done something/' SE19 (04:53-05:06). Defendant responded, "It wasn't h[im], it 
was me. I [got caught] up i n . . . drug thing I use drugs and . . . [my mind] 
go off." SE19 (05:07-05:36). When Officer Portel asked Defendant what kind of 
drugs he used, Defendant said it was cocaine. SE19 (05:36-05:50). 
Defendant's Trial Testimony 
At trial, Defendant claimed that he stabbed Pollock in self-defense. See R. 
170:117-28,131-32. He testifeid that Pollock, accompanied by a couple of other 
men, accused him of stealing drugs the night before. R. 170:119. He denied any 
knowledge of the stolen drugs and retreated to a bench near the shelter, hoping 
Defendant and his friends would stop harassing him. R. 170:119-21. He testified 
that about an hour later, they returned and Pollock sat down on the bench next to 
him and resumed his accusations. R. 170:121-22. He claimed that Pollock then 
attacked him with a knife. R. 170:122-23. He claimed that he grabbed one of two 
knives from his duffle bag and used it to ward off Pollock's attacks. R. 170:119, 
123. He testified that Pollock was swinging wildly and he was swinging back, 
but did not realize that he had inflicted any injury. R. 170:123-26. 
Defendant claimed that during the fight, Pollock "fell on the ground and 
thr[ew] his hands up, saying, "I'm done." R. 170:124,130-32. Defendant asserted 
that when he saw that Pollock no longer had the knife, he quit and walked away. 
11 
R. 170:124-26,130-32. Defendant denied assaulting Pollock after Pollock fell to 
the ground. R. 170:131. 
Defendant further testified that at the police station, officers "asked [him] a 
lot of questions" and that he told them that he "d[id]n't want to answer no more 
questions" and that he wanted to speak with a lawyer. R. 170:127. Defendant 
explained that when he told the officers the altercation started because of a 
"misunderstanding," he was speaking of Pollock's accusation that Defendant 
stole the drugs. R. 170:127-28. He explained that he was referring to the drug 
dispute when he told police that the altercation was over something "stupid." R. 
170:128. Finally, he explained that when he said, "It wasn't him; it was me," he 
was admitting that he had in fact stolen drugs from Pollock the night before. R. 
170:128. 
12 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. Waiver of Miranda Claim. Under rule 12, Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure, the failure to file a motion to suppress evidence at least five days 
before trial operates as a waiver of that claim, unless cause is shown justifying 
relief from that waiver. Because Defendant did not file his motion to suppress 
until the morning of trial, and offered no cause justifying relief from waiver of his 
Miranda claim, the district court properly deemed it waived. For the first time on 
appeal, Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion in not excusing 
the late filing, because the prosecutor suffered no prejudice and he suffered great 
prejudice. This Court should not consider these claims, because Defendant failed 
to preserve them by raising them below. In any event, the prosecutor was 
prejudiced by the late filing. He had no opportunity to review Defendant's 
allegations against the recording of the interview, nor was he able to research the 
applicable law. Moreover, prejudice suffered by a defendant who is dilatory in 
filing a motion to suppress is not sufficient to excuse the late filing. 
In the alternative, Defendant argues that the trial court in fact ruled on the 
merits. The court, however, made clear that its denial was based on Defendant's 
failure to comply with rule 12. In commenting on the merits, the court made clear 
that it was speaking hypothetically and simply for the edification of counsel. 
13 
Defendant also argues that his failure to comply with the filing 
requirements of rule 12 cannot be the basis for the denial of a constitutional 
challenge. This argument lacks merit. The United States Supreme Court has 
recognized that the right to raise a constitutional claim may be limited by rule. 
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. Defendant argues that even if his 
Miranda claim was waived, his conviction should be reversed because his trial 
counsel was constitutionally ineffective for not timely filing the motion to 
suppress. To prevail, Defendant must demonstrate that: (1) his trial counsel was 
deficient in faffing to file a nrnefy motion to suppress, and (2) the deficient 
performance prejudiced his defense. The St^te concedes that Defendant has 
satisfied the first prong. Defendant invoked his right to remain silent. 
Accordingly, had a timely motion been filed, Defendant's subsequent statements 
would have been suppressed. However, Defendant has not demonstrated that 
thos^ statements prejudiced him. The testimony of Ms. Cameron substantially 
corroborated the victim's claim that Defendant repeatedly assaulted him with a 
knif^. The severity of the injuries suffered by the victim, in stark contrast to the 
lack of any injury to Defendant, also renders admission of Defendant's statement 
harmless. In short, there is no reasonable probability of a different verdict had 
Defendant's statement been suppressed. 
14 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS MIRANDA CLAIM WHEN HE 
FAILED TO FILE A TIMELY MOTION TO SUPPRESS AND DID 
NOT OFFER ANY CAUSE EXCUSING THE UNTIMELY FILING 
Rule 12, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, requires that motions to 
suppress evidence "be raised at least five days prior to the trial/7 Utah R. Crim. P. 
12(c). The rule also provides that failure to comply with this requirement "shall 
constitute waiver thereof/7 Utah R. Crim. P. 12(f). Relying on this rule, the trial 
court concluded that Defendant "waived77 his Miranda claim because he did not 
file his motion until the morning of trial. See R. 100-01; R. 170: 7, 13-14. On 
appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in treating his 
untimely motion as waived. Aplt. Brf. at 21-26. His argument lacks merit. 
A. Defendant did not preserve his claim that he was entitled to relief 
from the waiver of his Miranda challenge on timeliness grounds. 
Defendant argues that under the plain language of rule 12, the trial court 
"has considerable discretion77 to grant relief to a defendant who fails to comply 
with rule 127s five-day filing requirement. Aplt. Brf. at 22,24. That much is true. 
Under rule 12, "the court for cause shown may grant relief from such waiver." 
Utah R. Crim. P. 12(f). On appeal, Defendant advances two reasons why the 
district court abused its discretion in not granting relief: (1) "the prosecution 
never claimed any prejudice caused by77 the late filing, but was prepared to argue 
15 
the merits of the motion, Aplt. Brf. at 22-23, 26; and (2) the "potential for 
prejudice" to Defendant was too great, given the constitutional nature of his 
claim, Aplt. Brf. at 22-24. Defendant, however, did not make these arguments to 
the trial court. Because Defendant failed to preserve them below, the Court 
should not address them now. 
The law is well settled that "to preserve an issue for appeal, a defendant 
must raise the issue before the district court in such a way that the court is placed 
on notice of potential error and then has the opportunity to correct or avoid the 
error." State v. Diaz-Arevalo, 2008 UT App 219, \ 10, 189 P.3d 85. When a 
defendant fails to do so, this Court will not consider it on appeal. See State v. 
Dean, 2004 UT 63, \ 13,95 P.3d 276 (holding that appellate court will not address 
unpreserved claim absent a showing of plain error or exceptional circumstances). 
After the prosecutor objected to the motion as untimely, Defendant did not 
argue, as "cause" for relief from waiver, that going forward would work no 
prejudice to the prosecution or that it would unfairly prejudice his own defense. 
Indeed, counsel for Defendant did not address the State's timeliness objection at 
all; she ignored it. See R. 170:10-13. Instead, she reiterated her argument on the 
3
 Defendant has not argued either plain error or exceptional circumstances 
on appeal, and therefore, this Court should not address them either. See Monson 
v. Carver, 928 P.2d 1017,1022 (Utah 1996) (refusing to address unpreserved claim 
where defendant "has not attempted to demonstrate the applicability of either 
exception" to the preservation rule). 
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merits of the motion. See R. 170:10-13. Defendant, therefore, failed to preserve 
his claims that his late filing should have been excused. 
Because Defendant failed to preserve these claims at trial, and has not 
argued plain error or exceptional circumstances, he has "waived the right to 
assert" them on appeal. State v. Weaver, 2005 UT 49, J 2,122 P.3d 566 (holding 
that defendant "waived the right to assert his challenge" on appeal "[bjecause 
[he] failed to preserve this issue below and failed to argue plain error in his 
opening brief"). It cannot be said that a trial court abused its discretion in not 
excusing an untimely motion to suppress where, as here, Defendant offered no 
cause to justify relief. 
B. In any event, Defendant was not entitled to relief from the waiver 
of his Miranda challenge on timeliness grounds. 
In any event, Defendant has not demonstrated that he was entitled to relief 
from the waiver of his Miranda challenge on timeliness grounds. 
1. Defendant has failed to demonstrate that the prosecution was 
not prejudiced by the untimeliness of his motion to suppress. 
Defendant argues that because the prosecutor was able to argue the merits 
of the Miranda challenge, he was entitled to relief from the waiver rule. See Aplt. 
Brf. at 22-23. He contends that the prosecutor "never claimed any prejudice 
caused by a lack of notice," but instead "indicated to the court that he was 
prepared to argue the motion on its merits and he then proceeded to do so." 
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Aplt Brf. at 22-23. This claim misconstrues the prosecution's response and 
ignores the record facts. 
After the district court learned that the prosecution intended to include in 
its opening statement some of Defendant's statements to police, it asked the 
prosecutor whether he was prepared to address the motion to suppress "at this 
time, recognizing that it was just served . . . this morning." R. 170: 6-7. The 
prosecutor responded, "Yes." R. 170: 7. While at first blush the prosecutor's 
response suggested that he would not object based on timeliness grounds, the 
record demonstrates otherwise. See 17-18. After defense counsel argued the 
motion, R. 170: 7-10, the prosecutor argued as follows: 
First of all, prior to going into the merits of this I want to make an 
objection based on timeliness. The Rules of Criminal Procedure 
explicitly state that a motion to suppress needs to be brought five 
days prior to trial; and this is only the morning of trial. Beyond that, 
I could offer to the Court a photocopy of the signed Miranda waiver 
that is signed by the defendant and also the officer who conducted 
the interview. 
R. 170: 10. Thus, the prosecutor's first and primary response was an objection 
based on imtimeliness. Only after making this objection did the prosecutor 
briefly turn to the merits. R. 170:10. 
Although the prosecutor ultimately addressed the merits, any competent 
litigator would have done the same. And contrary to Defendant's claim on 
appeal, Aplt. Brf. at 23, the prosecutor's response did not suggest that he was 
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fully prepared to address the merits. Quite the contrary. When defense counsel 
countered that Defendant had invoked his right to remain silent before signing 
the waiver form, the prosecutor complained that he " d i d n ' t know exactly how 
accurate th[e] transcript is." R. 170:11. Then, drawing from memory, he argued 
that Defendant's response to Officer Portel's query as to whether he wished to 
speak with police was "ambiguous." R. 170:11 (stating that Defendant "ma[de] 
some ambiguous noises, 'uh-huh/ or 'uh-uh'"). 
After Defendant appealed and filed his brief, the State received a copy of 
the recording, reviewed it, and stipulated that "Defendant unequivocally 
responded [to Officer Portel] that he did not want to waive his rights and speak 
with police." Stip. *j[ 10. Had the prosecutor been afforded a similar opportunity, 
as required under rule 12, he most certainly would have reached the same 
conclusion reached by the State on appeal. And in that case, he would have 
prepared his case for trial differently. But he was not afforded that opportunity 
and was forced to argue the motion based on his recollection of the recording. In 
sum, the untimely filing by Defendant amounted to an ambush, thereby denying 
the prosecution the opportunity to investigate both the facts and the relevant law, 
and then prepare for trial accordingly. In other words, he was prejudiced by the 
late filing. 
19 
2. Any prejudice suffered by a defendant as a result of his own 
dilatory filing does not compel the trial court to grant relief 
from the defendant's waiver. 
Relying on State v. Cornejo, 2006 UT App 215,138 P.3d 97, Defendant argues 
that the district court's refusal to address his motion to suppress was also 
improper because he suffered prejudice as a result of that refusal. See Aplt. Brf. at 
23-24. Cornejo, however, sets forth the standard against which motions to continue 
are judged. It does not suggest that a dilatory filing of a motion to suppress 
evidence may be excused simply because the defendant would otherwise be 
prejudiced. Indeed, Cornejo stands for the opposite proposition. 
Like Defendant in this case, Cornejo filed a motion to suppress evidence 
(blood sample from warrantless draw) on the day of trial. Cornejo, 2006 UT App 
215, \ 4. The prosecutor objected to the motion because it was untimely under 
rule 12. Id. at \ 5. The trial court overruled the prosecutor's objection and 
ordered an immediate evidentiary hearing outside the presence of the jury. Id. 
Missing a witness needed to address the motion, the prosecutor moved for a 
continuance. Id. at \ 6. The trial court denied the motion to continue and 
dismissed the case with prejudice. Id. at YSL 7-10. In denying the continuance, the 
court reasoned that "the State had wrongfully assumed that [Comedo's] failure to» 
file a motion to suppress at least five days before trial meant that [Cornejo] could 
not simply object to the introduction of the evidence at trial." Id. at % 7. The court 
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ruled that notwithstanding an untimely motion, the State must be prepared to 
proceed with its evidence "and have a legal basis for that to come in." Id. 
This Court reversed, holding that the denial of the State's request for a 
continuance "was 'an unreasonable action/" Id. at % 23 (citation omitted). Id. at % 
36. In so holding, the Court followed the four-step inquiry for continuances 
established in State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750 (Utah 1982): 
[W]hen a party to a criminal action "moves for a continuance in 
order to procure the testimony of an absent witness," the party must 
demonstrate that: (1) "the testimony sought is material and 
admissible," (2) "the witness could actually be produced," (3) "the 
witness could be produced within a reasonable time," and (4) "due 
diligence ha[d] been exercised before the request for a continuance." 
Cornejo, 2006 UT App 215, \ 15 (quoting Creviston, 646 P.2d at 752). The Court 
concluded that the first Creviston factor of materiality was satisfied because the 
absent officer's testimony was necessary to establish that a warrantless blood 
draw was necessary. Id. at W 16-17. It concluded that the second and third 
Creviston factors were satisfied because, as an employee of the Utah Highway 
Patrol, the absent witness '"could actually [have] be[en] produced . . . within a 
reasonable time.'" Id. at f 18 (citation omitted). And finally, it concluded that the 
fourth Creviston factor of due diligence was met because "the State accurately 
read rule 12 to require that Defendant timely file a motion to suppress and that 
his failure to do so waived any future ability to contest the admissibility of the 
blood sample." Id. at \ 22. 
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In summary, Cornejo articulates the standard for determining whether or 
not to grant a motion to continue, not whether or not to grant relief from the 
waiver consequences of an untimely motion to suppress. However, in applying 
that standard, Cornejo reaffirmed that untimely motions to suppress are "waived" 
under rule 12. Id. Therefore, far from undermining the district court's decision 
below, Creviston supports it. 
Even if the Creviston standard applied to a defendant's request for relief 
from waiver, Defendant wholly ignores the fourth Creviston requirement: the 
moving party must demonstrate that he or she exercised "due diligence" before 
the request for relief. Cornejo, 2006 UT App 215, % 15. Defendant made no such 
attempt below, nor has he on appeal. 
C. In commenting that it would have denied the motion to suppress 
had it reached the merits, the trial court did not purport to decide 
the motion on its merits. 
In the alternative, Defendant argues that the trial court issued a 
"subsequent cursory denial of the motion [to suppress] purportedly on its 
merits/' Aplt. Brf. at 22. A review of the judge's remarks, however, discounts 
Defendant's claim. After the judge "denied" the motion to suppress, "on the basis 
of the timeliness issue," he opined as to how he would have ruled had the claim 
not been waived: "if I were addressing the merits, if it were me, here's how I 
would have done it, I would rule that the motion ought to be denied." R. 170:14 
M 
(emphasis added). Moreover, he prefaced these comments by specifically 
indicating that they were "for edification of the Counsel." R. 170:14. In other 
words, the judge did not purport to rule on the merits, as Defendant contends on 
appeal. 
In summary, the basis of the trial court's ruling was that Defendant waived 
his Miranda claim when he failed to timely file the motion to suppress. Because 
the court treated the untimely filing as a waiver, Defendant's Miranda claim was 
not preserved and he may not challenge it on appeal. The trial court's subsequent 
comments were advisory only. They "d[id] not embody the resolution or 
determination of the court" and were thus mere dicta. Black's Law Dictionary 
236 (5th ed. 1983). 
In support of his claim, Defendant cites State v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1048 
(Utah 1991). Aplt. Brf. at 25 (quoting R. 170: 14). That case, however, is 
inapposite. 
At the beginning of trial in Matsamas, defense counsel moved the trial court 
to make certain reliability findings, as required by statute, before allowing 
hearsay statements of a child abuse victim. Matsamas, 808 P.2d at 1052. The trial 
court ruled that it would not address the admissibility of any testimony until it 
was before the court during trial. Id. When the prosecutor tried to elicit the 
hearsay at trial, defense counsel objected, arguing that it could be admitted only 
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after the trial court made the required reliability findings. Id. The trial court 
overruled the objection, concluding that the testimony would help both the court 
and jury in deciding what had occurred. Id. 
On appeal, the State acknowledged that the trial court did not make the 
necessary reliability findings. Id. However, for the first time on appeal, the State 
argued that under rule 12, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, Matsamas waived 
his right to raise that issue on appeal "because defense counsel did not object to 
the testimony until trial/7 Id. This Court rejected the State's waiver argument. Id. 
at 1053. The Court held that because the trial court "chose not to treat 
defendant's failure to [timely] raise the issue . . . as a waiver," but instead 
"proceeded to consider the claim," the trial court "effectively waived the 
requirements of rule 12." Id. The Court thus held that "the objection was 
preserved for appeal." Id. 
Unlike Matsamas, the prosecutor in this case objected at trial to the motion 
to suppress on timeliness grounds. And unlike Matsamas, the trial court below 
treated Defendant's failure to timely file his motion to suppress as a waiver. See 
R. 170:13-14. As explained above, the trial court below spoke hypothetically and 
specifically stated that its remarks were for the edification of counsel. In other 
words, unlike the case in Matsamas, the court's remarks were never meant to be a 
binding ruling on the merits. 
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D. The right to raise a constitutional claim may properly be regulated 
by procedural rule. 
Finally, Defendant argues that a trial court may not deny, on procedural 
grounds, an untimely motion to suppress evidence that alleges a constitutional 
violation. See Aplt Brf. at 25-26. But the cases cited by Defendant are inapposite. 
Indeed, they do not even purport to address the effect of an untimely or 
unpreserved constitutional claim. See Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960) 
(issue of whether challenge was timely or otherwise preserved not raised or 
addressed); Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967) (same); Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436 (1966) (same); Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538,543-44 (1967) (same). 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that a defendant has a 
"constitutional right at some stage in the proceedings to object to the use of a 
confession and to have a fair hearing and a reliable determination" of the issue by 
the trial court. Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 376-77 (1964) (emphasis added). 
The Court has held, however, that the right to assert constitutional claims is "not 
available indefinitely and without limitation. Procedural barriers, such as 
statutes of limitation and rules concerning procedural default and exhaustion of 
remedies, operate to limit access to review on the merits of a constitutional 
claim." Daniels v. United States, 532 U.S. 374, 381 (2001); accord Singer v. United 
States, 380 U.S. 24, 35 (1965) ("[I]t has long been accepted that the waiver of 
constitutional rights can be subjected to reasonable procedural regulations."). 
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The high Court has thus repeatedly recognized that "'a constitutional right/ or a 
right of any other sort, 'may be forfeited in criminal as well as civil cases by the 
failure to make timely assertion of the right before a tribunal having jurisdiction to 
determine i t ' " United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 731 (1993) (quoting Yakus v. 
United States, 321 U.S. 414,444 (1944)) (emphasis added); accord Daniels, 532 U.S. 
at 381. Such was the case here. 
II. 
DEFENDANT HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT HIS TRIAL 
COUNSEL WAS CONSTITUTIONALLY INEFFECTIVE FOR 
NOT FILING A TIMELY MOTION TO SUPPRESS HIS 
STATEMENTS 
Defendant argues that his trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective for 
failing to timely file the motion to suppress his statement to police. Aplt. Brf. at 
15-20. To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must 
satisfy the two-prong test established in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,689 
(1984). He must demonstrate that (1) "counsel's performance was deficient/' and 
(2) "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Id. at 687. Ineffective 
assistance of counsel will not be found unless the defendant "makes both 
showings." Id. In this case, Defendant has satisfied the first prong of the 
Strickland test. However, he has not satisfied the second prong. Therefore, his 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails. 
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A. The State concedes that trial counsel was deficient because a 
timely motion to suppress would have resulted in the exclusion of 
Defendant's statement to police. 
Because Defendant's ineffectiveness claim rests on his counsel's failure to 
timely file the motion to suppress alleging a Miranda violation, the Court "must 
first decide whether defendant's Miranda rights were actually violated," State v. 
Snyder, 860 P.2d 351 (Utah App. 1993); accord State v. Ferry, 2007 UT App 128, \ 
12,163 P.3d 647. If they were not, counsel cannot be said to have performed 
deficiently in failing to raise a motion that would have failed. See State v. Perez-
Avila, 2006 UT App 71, \ 7,131 P.2d 864 (holding that "counsel's performance at 
trial is not deficient if counsel refrains from making futile objections, motions, or 
requests"). 
Under Miranda v. Arizona, police may not question a suspect in custody 
unless they first inform him that "he has the right to remain silent, that any 
statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has the 
right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed." 384 U.S. 436, 
444 (1966). "After an officer has informed a suspect of his Miranda rights and has 
determined that the suspect understands those rights, the officer must then 
determine if the suspect is willing to waive those rights and answer questions." 
State v. Leyva, 951 P.2d 738, 744 (Utah 1997). If the suspect invokes his right to 
remain silent, questioning must cease; if he requests coimsel, questioning must 
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cease "until an attorney is present." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74. If, on the other 
hand, the suspect voluntarily waives his rights "after receiving the Miranda 
warnings, law enforcement officers are free to question him." Davis v. United 
States, 512 U.S. 452,458 (1994). 
In this case, Defendant invoked his right to remain silent. After he was 
taken to the police station, Officer Portel read Defendant his Miranda rights. Stip. 
12. She then told him that he would need to sign the waiver form if he wished to 
speak with her. Id. When Defendant asked whether he had to sign it, Officer 
Portel told him no. Id. Defendant then shook his head and replied,"] won't." Id. 
After re-coniirming that Defendant did not want to sign the waiver form, Officer 
Portel asked, "So, you don't want to answer any questions right now?" Id. Again 
shaking his head, Defendant replied, "Huh-uh." Id. The State concedes that 
Defendant unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent at that time. See Stip. 
110. 
Where Defendant invoked his right to remain silent, police were required 
to cease further questioning. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-44. Because they did 
not, see SE19, Defendant's subsequent statement to police would have been 
excluded had trial counsel moved for their suppression within the time limits of 
rule 12, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. See id. As in Snyder, the record here 
reveals "no legitimate trial tactic to be served by [counsel's failure] to comply 
28 
with [rule 12's] filing requirement." 860 P.2d at 359. Accordingly, "in failing to 
timely file the motion to suppress, counsel's performance was objectively 
deficient." Id. 
B. Where the evidence against Defendant was overwhelming, the 
improper admission of his statements to police was not 
prejudicial. 
Although Defendant has satisfied the first prong of the Strickland test, to 
prevail he must also demonstrate that "the deficient performance prejudiced [his] 
defense." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. To satisfy this prong, Defendant "must 
show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for [the failure of counsel to 
timely move for suppression], the [jury verdict] would have been different." Id. 
at 694; accord Snyder, 860 P.2d at 359. As explained in Strickland, "[a] reasonable 
probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." 
466 U.S. at 694; accord Snyder, 860 P.2d at 359. Defendant has not satisfied this 
prong of the Strickland test. Therefore, his claim must fail. 
Defendant argues that his admissions to police were "absolutely critical" 
because both he and Pollock had "serious credibility issues" and Gail Cameron, 
the disinterested witness, "saw only the last portion of the fight." Aplt. Brf. at 20, 
19. He contends that absent his statement to police, "there is a reasonable 
probability the jury would have acquitted him." Aplt. Brf. at 20. This contention 
ignores the overwhelming evidence against Defendant. 
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Pollock claimed that Defendant stabbed him because Pollock refused to 
give him any cocaine. Defendant claimed that Pollock stabbed him because 
Defendant stole drugs from him. Had this been the only evidence, admission of 
Defendant's statements would have been problematic. But contrary to 
Defendant's argument on appeal, Gail Cameron's testimony was more than 
sufficient to dispel any doubt that Defendant assaulted Pollock. 
Gail Cameron was a disinterested witness who viewed most of the 
altercation on a monitor at the front desk inside the homeless shelter. See R. 170: 
61-67,71-72. Although she did not see the initial exchange, she saw Defendant 
fall to the ground on his back. R. 170: 63, 71-72. She testified that she then saw 
Pollock lying "on his back, with his hands and his feet in the air, as though he 
were trying to defend himself." R. 170: 63-64, 71-72. She then saw Defendant 
standing over Pollock and testified that he appeared angry and poised to hit 
Pollock. R. 170: 65-66. She testified that Defendant then leaned over and 
appeared to slug Pollock two or three times, but that after Defendant stopped and 
stood up, she saw that he was holding a knife with a 3-5 inch blade. R. 170:66-67, 
75. 
The foregoing testimony strongly corroborated Pollock's testimony that 
after he fell to the ground, Defendant stabbed him again in the stomach, in the 
shoulder, and in the buttocks. R. 170: 27-28, 53-54. Her testimony also 
3G 
corroborated Pollock's claim that he was only trying to defend himself with his 
hands and feet during this exchange. See R. 170:66,75. Defendant discounts Ms. 
Cameron's testimony because "[s]he was not watching the monitor when the 
fight started, so she did not see who initiated the attack." Aplt. Brf. at 19. 
However, even if Pollock had instigated the fight, all three who testified— 
Pollock, Cameron, and Defendant—agreed that after Pollock fell to the ground, 
he was not posing a threat to Defendant. See R. 170: 26-27, 46-47, 53, 110 
(Pollock's testimony); R. 170:63-64,66,75 (Cameron's testimony); R. 170:124-26, 
130-32 (Defendant's testimony). Thus, even if Defendant had initially acted in 
self-defense, he clearly was not doing so after Pollock fell to the ground. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-2-402 (West 2004) (self-defense statute). Where there was no 
legitimate self-defense claim after Pollock's fall, Ms. Cameron's testimony 
corroborated the subsequent aggravated assault. 
Pollock's extensive injuries also belie Defendant's claim of self-defense. 
Whereas Defendant received no injuries, the injuries suffered by Pollock were 
extensive and perhaps life-threatening if not treated. Surgeons removed 12 
inches of his large intestine. R. 170: 30. He suffered a laceration to his colon, 
which required the insertion of a colostomy bag. R. 170:30. He suffered a large 
laceration across his shoulder, which was stapled together during surgery. R. 
170:30. Pollock was in the hospital five to eight weeks before being released. R. 
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170: 31. Pollock wore the colostomy bag for another month or so and had a 
second surgery to remove the bag and "put back together" his colon. R. 170:32. 
In the process, Pollock lost 50 pounds and suffered other digestive difficulties. R. 
170:33-34.4 
In light of the foregoing corroborating evidence, no "reasonable probability 
exists that the jury's verdict would have been more favorable to defendant had 
the information from the interview been suppressed." Snyder, 860 P.2d at 359. 
Accordingly, Defendant's ineffectiveness claim fails in any event. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendant's conviction. 
Respectfully submitted February 2,2009. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
Y S. GRAY , 
-"Assistant Attorney Gene^l 
Counsel for Appellee 
4
 It should also be noted that Defendant's statement to police was not a full 
blown confession. While it was certainly susceptible to being interpreted as an 
admission, as argued by the prosecutor, it was also susceptible to being 
interpreted as referring only to the drug dispute, as claimed by Defendant and 
argued by his counsel. See R. 170:127-28. 
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ADDENDUM 
U.S. Const, amend. V 
. . . nor shall any person.. . be compelled in any criminal case to 
be a witness against himself 
U.S. Const, amend. VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the r ight . . . 
to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 12 
* * * 
(c) Time for filing specified motions. Any defense, objection 
or request, including request for rulings on the admissibility of 
evidence, which is capable of determination without the trial of the 
general issue may be raised prior to trial by written motion. 
(c)(1) The following shall be raised at least five days prior to 
the trial: 
* * * 
(c)(1)(B) motions to suppress evidence; 
* * * 
(e) A motion made before trial shall be determined before trial 
unless the court for good cause orders that the ruling be deferred for 
later determination. Where factual issues are involved in 
determining a motion, the court shall state its findings on the record. 
(f) Failure of the defendant to timely raise defenses or 
objections or to make requests which must be made prior to trial or 
at the time set by the court shall constitute waiver thereof, but the 
court for cause shown may grant relief from such waiver. 
* * * 
